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Abstract 
This research examines effects of various factors on participation in agricultural tree plantations 
for economic, environmental, social and carbon-uptake purposes.  Using survey data from 2000 
mail surveys of Canadian farmers, a discrete choice random utility analysis is used to determine 
probability of farmers’ participation and the corresponding mean willingness to accept a tree-
planting program.  Estimation results show that the required compensation for accepting a tree-
planting program is higher than the compensation suggested by a normative approach. 
Introduction 
Climate change will likely remain a widely debated issue on the agenda of many concerned 
governments in the world.  On scientific grounds, there appears to be consensus that emissions of 
greenhouse gases, carbon dioxide in particular, are responsible for the relatively recent rising in 
global temperatures.  To mitigate the process of global warming, some countries may decide to 
increase carbon storage capacity through forest sinks in place of costly emissions reductions.  
Despite disagreement over the role of terrestrial carbon sinks, management of terrestrial biomass 
in forests, grasslands and agricultural land could play a role in a comprehensive land-use policy 
of any country in the world.  Land-use management in agriculture and forestry requires 
evaluation in terms of relative economic efficiency and cost effectiveness.  
One option for achieving significant carbon offsets is to plant trees on marginal 
agricultural land.  In addition to providing C-uptake benefits and potential commercial timber 
benefits, tree planting could provide extra-market benefits such as reduced soil erosion, 
improved water quality, increased wildlife habitat, riparian buffer zones and aesthetic appeal.  
Afforestation could thus be pursued regardless of concerns about climate change.  Since benefits  
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of planting trees would accrue to society, compensation would need to be provided to 
landowners if they are to change their land use from agriculture to forestry. 
The purpose of the current study is to determine how much landowners would need to be 
compensated to convert their crop land to forested land.  This is not straightforward for several 
reasons: (1) there is uncertainty about the costs of tree planting, actual yields and stumpage 
values due to geographical differences in proximity to saw mills, pulp mills or biomass burning 
facilities; (2) returns to current investments may accrue in the distant future causing disruptions 
in income flows that could increase the required compensation; (3) landowners may perceive the 
financial risks of planting trees to be too great for lack of knowledge and skills; and, (4) by 
planting trees, farmers may feel that their ability to participate in current and future government 
agricultural programs is threatened because of their reduced capacity to produce agricultural 
commodities. 
In addition, the compensation amount should include forgone agricultural returns 
(including any price support or subsidy payments) from the land and any other associated non-
market values that the landowner realizes from agriculture.  Since non-market values often play a 
significant role in farming decisions, a compensation amount equal to agricultural rents may not 
be enough to convince landowners to change the use of the land.  A contingent valuation 
methodology allows for the incorporation of non-market values and other unobservable 
opportunity costs into the compensation amount. 
This research uses data from surveys mailed to western Canadian farmers to examine 
their willingness to accept (WTA) compensation for participation in tree planting programs.  A 
discrete choice random utility framework is constructed to represent landowners’ preferences 
towards adopting tree planting on their most marginal land.  Landowners are offered a  
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compensation bid for removal of land from production.  The random utility framework models 
the choice between rejecting the bid and keeping the land in production, and accepting the bid 
and removing the land from production in favor of tree planting.  The landowner will accept the 
bid and allow conversion of the land as long as the compensation offered is at least as much as 
the opportunity cost of not producing.  The applied probit model estimates the probability of 
accepting a tree-planting program. 
The paper is organized as follows.  A general overview of theory is presented followed 
by a discussion the data and explanation of the empirical model.  The paper concludes with 
model results and discussion of policy implications. 
Random Utility Model 
Hanemann (1984) derives a theoretical random utility maximization (RUM) framework for 
analyzing binary data that usually depict an individual's yes or no stand on a particular issue.  
The basic premise of RUM is that an individual chooses rationally the option that yields the 
highest utility.  Assuming constant prices, the utility of an individual can be written as 
(1)   ) s , m ( u a , i , 
where i indicates an individual, a the discrete decision, {a = 1 if yes; a = 0 if no}; m is income; 
and, s represents other observable attributes that set individuals apart. 
Hanemann (1984) assumes that an individual knows his or her utility with certainty, but 
the yes/no outcome is probabilistic since the researcher will never be able to account for all 
relevant exogenous variables and variations among individuals.  The utility function 
) s , m ( u a , i can be specified as a function of a deterministic component  ) s , m ( v a , i , and an additive 
stochastic component  a , i e ,  
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(2)  a , i a , i a , i ) s , m ( v ) s , m ( u e + = , 
 
where  0 , i e  and  1 , i e  are i.i.d. random variables with zero means and variance  2 s .  The utility 
function (2) is itself a random variable with mean  ) s , m ( u a , i .  The RUM models the difference 
in utilities of the two (yes and no) alternatives that can be thought of as an underlying continuous 
index function (Greene, 1997).  Hanemann (1984) applies the difference in indirect utilities of 
two alternatives and thus proposes a way of calculating the compensating surplus welfare 
measure. 
Survey of Canadian Farmers 
A mail survey was chosen that identified 2000 randomly selected farmers from the grain belt 
region of Canada, which includes northeastern British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan and 
Manitoba.  Farmers with less than 160 acres of land were omitted from the survey sample since 
small landowners were unlikely to contribute relatively significant portions of their land.
1  Dairy 
farmers were also excluded from the sample for their presumed high opportunity cost of tree 
planting due to value-added production. 
The survey includes a brief, personalized cover letter explaining the purpose of the 
questionnaire and a definition of carbon credit.  The actual survey is split into six sections 
beginning with a short explanatory page that attempts to motivate farmers into responding, while 
pointing out the climate-change mitigation benefits of tree planting.  Section one of the survey 
comprises opinion questions and a history of former contracts of which a farmer may have been 
                                                        
1 Bell, Robers, Englis and Park (1994) consider landowners with 100 or more acres in their study of participation in 
Tennessee's Forest Stewardship Program.  
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involved.  In section two, farmers are asked to describe their farming enterprise by identifying 
their least productive fields.  This information is helpful in determining the ability of marginal 
land to support growing trees.  The remainder of section two asks farmers to identify the 
livestock they own.  The questions are meant to obtain insights into economies of scale 
associated with raising livestock that could be disrupted as a result of tree planting.  Section three 
is a one-page sub-survey of adaptation strategies that farmers might employ in order to avert 
losses from agriculture or take advantage of new opportunities brought about by warmer climate. 
The aforementioned sections allow the respondents to become familiar with the topic and 
issues under investigation.  This is followed by the section most relevant for this particular study, 
which focuses on farmers' willingness to plant trees.  Farmers are presented with a hypothetical 
program that covers all costs of tree planting and compensates for the lost value of production by 
offering farmers a bid to convert their most marginal plot of land to tree planting under a 10 year 
contract.  In the absence of a priori valuation information, the compensation levels are selected 
based on the results of a pilot study and range from $1 to $60 per acre annually.  The distribution 
of these bids is skewed towards the lower bound of the range in order to provide more efficient 
estimates of WTA, as recommended by Cooper (1993).  The contingent contract indicates that 
farmers have no right to harvest the trees before the contract expires, but trees become their 
property at the end of the contract.  No compensation is provided for the reversed conversion 
back to agriculture.  The farmers also respond to a second follow-up bid proposed for the same 
program under a longer contract length. 
The final two sections of the survey include a section on institutions where farmers are 
given an opportunity to identify their willingness to engage in contracting with various parties 
for carbon credits and questions eliciting the demographic information of respondents, some of 
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which is used in this study and will be described in further detail later.  The survey data provide a 
wealth of information and data on farmers’ roles and perceptions towards climate change.  
Options for further research will be discussed in the conclusion to this paper
2. 
The survey was completed in the summer of 2000.  The response rate is calculated by 
subtracting the number of undelivered surveys from the total number of surveys distributed.  Out 
of the initial 2000 surveys sent out, 379 were returned undelivered, casting a doubt on the overall 
reliability of the address list.
3  However, reminder cards accomplished an effective response rate 
of 13 percent.
4  This response rate is just slightly higher than the 12 percent response rates 
reported by the Environics Research Group (2000) in their study of stewardship of Canadian 
farmers and Bell et al. (1994).  The actual response rate is likely significantly higher than 13 
percent, but remains unknown due to some unreliable addresses. 
Empirical Model 
Assuming that a farmer derives his or her utility from income and either tree planting or current 
agricultural activities, farmer i will say "yes" (a = 1) to tree planting with a proposed 
compensation if 
(3)  0 , i 0 , i 1 , i 1 , i ) s , m ( v ) s , m m ( v e + ‡ e + D + , 
and "no" otherwise.  The observed change in income when tree planting is accepted,  m D , is 
comprised of the compensation amount (B) plus annualized future timber harvest benefits minus 
the forgone annual agricultural benefits (OC), all discounted over the contract period.  Since 
                                                        
2 See Suchanek (2001) for complete survey details and a copy of the survey. 
3 See Suchanek (2001) for more details. 
4 Effective response rate = returned / (sent - undelivered) * 100%. 
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utility is a random variable, the probability distribution of a farmer's choice to accept the bid 
amount can be written (suppressing subscript i) as 
(4) 
{ } { }
[ ] { } ) s , m ( v ) s , m m ( v ) ( Pr
) s , m ( v ) s , m m ( v Pr 1 a Pr
0 1 0 1
0 0 1 1
- D + - ‡ e - e =
e + ‡ e + D + = =
. 
 
Replacing [ ] s - D + / ) s , m ( v ) s , m m ( v 0 1  with  v D  and  s e - e / ) ( 1 0  with e, where  ) 1 , 0 ( N ~ e  
yields the probit model 
(5)  ( ) v F } v Pr{ ) 1 a Pr( D = D - ‡ e = = e , 
where  e F  is the normal cumulative distribution function (cdf).
5  Its argument represents the 
difference in utilities of yes and no responses.  One simplification is made by not including 
timber benefits in the  m D  measure even though the contingent valuation scenario stipulates that 
trees become farmer's property when contract matures.  It is assumed that annualized timber 
benefits will not significantly impact the decision to accept the tree-planting bid since the 
reversed conversion costs offset, at least to some extent, the timber returns.  Stump removal and 
root raking put land out of production for one to two years and require, therefore, compensation 
for the production lost.  Timber returns also occur relatively far in the future, thus creating a 
considerable risk premium further offsetting any timber benefits.  The alternative to converting 
the land back to agriculture is keeping it in forestry, which requires farmer's long-term 
commitment to growing trees and learning about forestry practices, timber marketing or forestry 
                                                        
5 Initially, two discrete responses to two different program levels were modeled using a bivariate probability density 
function with non-zero error correlation.  The two valuation errors were consistently found to be significantly 
uncorrelated, therefore, the analysis proceeded with a single probit estimation for the first program level. 
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as a whole.  As Plantinga (1997) points out, other studies of large-scale tree planting programs 
also ignore timber benefits even though, "in theory, forestry rents will be capitalized into the 
value of the land and may therefore decrease the level of required compensation" (p. S270-
S271). 
Therefore, a farmer will base his or her decision to accept the proposed compensation on 
returns from the least economically marginal acre of land, by comparing  ) s , OC B m ( v1 - +  and 
) s , m ( v0 , where B is the bid and OC is the opportunity cost or current agricultural returns from 
the acre.
6  Following Hanemann's (1984) example, when the least marginal acre of land is 
considered (i.e., the first acre to be made available for tree planting), the deterministic parts of 
the two utility functions can be written as: 
(6) 
s m ' ) s , m ( v
s ) OC B m ( ' ) s , OC B m ( v
0 0 0
1 1 1
d + b + a =
d + - + b + a = - +
. 
Subtracting  1 v  from  0 v  and dividing by s results in 
(7)  ) s ( / ) ( ) OC B ( / ' / ) ( ) s , OC B ( v 0 1 0 1 s d - d + - s b + s a - a = - D , 
which can be rewritten as 
(8)  s ) OC B ( ) s , OC B ( v d + - b + a = - D , 
where  s a - a = a / ) ( 0 1 ,  s b = b / '  and  s d - d = d / ) ( 0 1 .  This provides an empirical estimate of 
) 1 a Pr( =  that is also the conditional mean probability of a.  The  [ ] X | a E  is then equal to: 
                                                        
6 For convenience, the error terms associated with each of the utilities have been dropped. 
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(9)  [ ] v d e
2
1




= D f = D = = =




e a , 
where  X  is a vector of exogenous variables,  e F  is the standard normal cumulative distribution 
function and f  is the corresponding density function (see Greene, 1997). 
The log-likelihood function is given as 













where h(.) represents standard normal distribution function.   
Hanemann (1984) proposes a conceptual approach for deriving farmer's minimum WTA 
compensation, denoted by B
*.  In effect, this can be accomplished by determining the amount of 
money needed to keep the farmer just indifferent between accepting the bid and retaining his or 
her marginal land in agriculture.  Analogously, one can express this indifference by setting the 
probability of accepting a bid to 0.5 and solving for B
*, 
(11)  { } 5 . 0 ) s , m ( v ) s , OC B m ( v Pr ) 1 a Pr( 0 0 1
*
1 = e + ‡ e + - + = = . 
In (12), the probability of accepting the bid, B
*, is the same as the probability of rejecting it.  
Given the symmetric properties of the standard normal c.d.f. yields 











- = ￿ = d + - b + a = D s OC B 0 s OC B v * * . 
This result facilitates the interpretation of two basic welfare measures, the median and the mean 
willingness to accept.  The median is the value of B that corresponds to a value of Pr(a = 1) = 0.5  
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and is equivalent to B
*.  Hanemann (1984) shows that specifying utility as in (6) results in the 
mean being equal to the median and ensures that no 'income effects' occur since probabilities are 
independent of the individual's income
7.  Hanemann (1984) ascertains that only the median and 
mean "are fully compatible with the notion of cardinal utility" (p. 336).  In the case that they 
differ, the choice of measure is left to the researcher's discretion.
8 
Variable Description 
Many survey data were applied to model estimation, but only a particular set of variables seemed 
to fit the model best.  The choice of variables is summarized in Table 1, but the opportunity cost 
estimate deserves further attention.  Farmers have the opportunity to indicate land-use of up to 
four of their least marginal fields.  The land-use types are combined into three categories: 
pasture, hay and grain.
9  For each of these categories, average contribution margins are 
calculated using crop revenues and variable costs of production across the commodities, soil 
zones and provinces that incorporate average prices for the past four to eight years.
10  Each field 
provided by a farmer is assigned an opportunity cost based on its land-use.  The opportunity cost 
is simply the minimum of the four (or less if a farmer provided less than four) least marginal 
fields.  Table 2 illustrates values for the opportunity cost variable used in the regressions. 
Not all returned surveys can be used for the probit estimation.  The efficient design of the 
survey does not allow those respondents unwilling to accept compensation in principle to answer 
the contingent valuation questions.  While these responses could be construed as a “no” response 
                                                        
7 The assumption of no income effects (or a constant marginal utility of income is common in random utility 
modeling in order to facilitate welfare calculations.  Recent literature has relaxed this assumption (e.g. Herriges and 
Kling (1999)) 
8 See Hanemann (1984) for more detailed discussion of the merits of each measure. 
9 The category grain includes the following: wheat, canola, barley, rye, oats, flax, lentils, peas and summerfallow. 
10 These numbers are provided by Suchanek (2001) and are based on information supplied by provincial 
governments.  
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for any bid amount, they are not included in this analysis.  As a result of this and some missing 
data, only 86 observations are used in the estimation of willingness to accept. 
 
Results 
The coefficients of the probit model are estimated using the Maximum Likelihood Module of 
GAUSS 3.1.  The likelihood ratio test is used to evaluate the overall significance of the model.  
The likelihood ratio test under the null hypothesis that all the coefficient estimates except the 
constant are equal to zero is equal to 42.12, which is rejected at five-percent significance level 
and with 13 degrees of freedom.  The likelihood ratio index can also be used to derive a 
goodness of fit measure, which in this case is equal to 0.37 (Greene, 1997).
11 
A natural extension of the 'goodness of fit' discussion is to present prediction results for 
this model.  This model accurately predicts roughly 81.5 percent of observed 'yes' and 'no' 
answers (see Table 3).  This prediction is based on a threshold probability of a 'yes' response 
equal to 0.5.  That is, if the computed probability of a 'yes' answer is less than 0.5, a 'no' response 
is predicted.  On the other hand, computed probability of a 'yes' response greater or equal to 0.5 
indicates a prediction of a 'yes' response.  To put these results into perspective, a naive model is 
often presented.  A naive model always predicts a 'yes' or a 'no' response depending on whose 
sample proportion is higher.  In this sample, the proportion of 'no' responses is 0.62, which 
means that a naive model would accurately predict 62 percent of responses (only the 'no' 
responses would be predicted successfully).  The probit model improves the prediction by almost 
20 percent in this case. 
                                                        
11 The Shazam User's Reference Manual (1993) discusses a wide range of other R-square measures, among them 
Maddala R-Square: R
2 = 1-exp{2[lnL0 -lnL]/n}.  For this sample, this measure is equal to 0.40. 
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Given that the model is highly significant and fits the data reasonably well provides credibility 
for discussion of parameter estimates that are presented in Table 4.  In this table, the marginal 
effect of a continuous variable x is computed as 












) x ( f
) x ( d
) x ( dF
x
] x | y [ E
, 
where f(.) is the standard normal probability density function (Greene, 1997).  As usual, the 
slope is evaluated at the sample mean of x since the marginal effect is a function of x.
12  The 
appropriate marginal effect of a dummy variable d is equal to 
(14)  ] 0 d , X | 1 Y Pr[ ] 1 d , X | 1 Y Pr[
d
] d | y [ E




where the matrix  X  represents all the other variables in the probit model evaluated at their 
sample means. 
Table 4 shows that only two coefficient estimates are significant at the five-percent level.  
The difference between the offered compensation and the forgone agricultural return (on per acre 
basis) has a significant positive effect on the 'yes' probability.  A one-dollar increase in the 
difference between the offered bid and forgone agricultural returns implies an average increase 
of almost one-percent in the probability of accepting the bid.  Similarly, the more trees a farmer 
has, according to the reported forested area on a given farm, the more likely he or she is to 
engage in more tree planting.  However, the effect of an additional acre of tree cover currently on 
a farm produces only a 0.1 percent increase in the probability to say 'yes' to future tree planting. 
                                                        
12 Another approach is to compute a marginal effect for each observation and calculate a sample average of the 
individual effects (Greene, 1997). 
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The visual variable is significant at ten percent level.  This means that for a farmer who 
perceives further increase in local tree cover as visually unappealing, the probability of accepting 
a tree-planting program is lower than for a farmer fond of trees.  The marginal effect on the 
probability to accept for a one-step increase on the scale of the visual variable is approximately 
14 percent.  So the difference in probabilities to accept a tree-planting program between a farmer 
who very much enjoys the esthetics of trees and a farmer who prefers the look of fewer-tree 
landscape can be as high as 56 percent.  Other coefficients are not significantly different from 
zero even at the ten-percent significance level, but some come close such as age, dummy for 
brown soil type and networth.  Even though a coefficient estimate is not significantly different 
from zero, its sign may provide information about the possible direction of the overall effect on 
the dependent variable. 
As discussed in the previous section, the estimated coefficients can be used to compute the 
minimum amount of compensation required to make the respondent just indifferent between 
accepting and rejecting it.  It has been shown that this amount is the mean and median 


















OC B* , 
provides such compensation level for each observation.  This new variable has its own sample 
distribution whose measures are depicted in Table 5. 
Table 5 shows that the average compensation of about 40 dollars per acre is required in 
order to encourage farmers to plant blocks of trees.  Interestingly, some farmers are willing to 
pay as much as 28 dollars per acre to have a tree-planting program introduced to them, while 
others demand over 100 dollars per acre to plant trees.  The negative WTA, interpreted as  
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positive WTP indicates the benefits to the farmer from forested land.  It is important to keep in 
mind that this discussion pertains to the least marginal acre.  Based on the results of this 
research, a compensation of 40 dollars per acre would entice farmers to plant at least one acre of 
their farmland (the least marginal) to blocks of trees. 
Conclusion 
Assuming that a farmer chooses to plant trees on the least marginal field that is likely to be used 
as pasture and/or for hay production, this compensation is roughly equal to the opportunity cost 
of the land.  However, what is not included in the compensation demanded by farmers is the cost 
of establishing, monitoring and management of tree planting that would have to be incurred by 
farmers were the government not willing to subsidize it.  Even if timber provided farmers with 
relatively guaranteed returns equal to forgone returns from agriculture, farmers would be 
unwilling to plant blocks of trees on their land without financial incentives.  This result indicates 
that there are some non-market benefits of not planting entire blocks of trees on marginal 
agricultural land that a farmer need to be compensated for. 
The main reason for retaining land in agriculture is that tree plantations appear to be 
financially unattractive, but other factors can also play an important role.  While farmers with 
land already planted to more trees demand lower compensation for their forgone agricultural 
returns than farmers with fewer trees, others who perceive increased tree cover as visually 
unappealing need greater timber returns to offset their current economic activities than those 
fond of trees. 
In addition, the results suggest that older farmers would be willing to accept lower 
compensation for conversion of their agricultural land to trees.  Moreover, wealthier farmers 
have likely a competitive advantage to less-well-off farmers because of their higher skills and  
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abilities that provide them with greater agricultural returns.  As a result, these farmers appear to 
require higher compensation in order to forgo agricultural production and could be less likely to 
participate in a tree-planting program. 
Further research could investigate the costs of establishing and running the program on 
provincial and national levels and provide guidance to the kinds of incentives and mechanisms 
that would make the program implementation as effective as possible.  While total cost of 
implementing the program including farmers' compensation is unknown, the government could 
use the results of this study for targeting farmers with characteristics that make them accept the 
least compensation. 
To what extent biological mitigation of climate change in the form of afforestation of 
marginal agricultural land in the grain-belt region of Canada can contribute to the country's 
carbon emissions reduction remains unknown for lack of knowledge about the supply 
relationship between the WTA and acres provided.  Using additional data from this survey on the 
number of acres provided at a given compensation level together with the findings of this study 
could provide this information.  Further analysis on the types of institutions, trees and programs 
necessary for afforestation on Canadian agricultural land is also undergoing
13.   
This research has developed and estimated a model for farmers’ WTA compensation for 
converting marginal agricultural land for tree planting programs.  Using a discrete choice random 
utility framework, the probability of accepting a proposed bid was estimated and the mean WTA 
was calculated to be approximately $40 per acre.  This provides valuable and necessary 
information and insights into the costs of afforestation for Canadian farmland.  
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Table 1.  Definitions of Variables. 
Name  Variable Description 
BOC1  Compensation offered in the first question minus the opportunity cost. 
ProvAB  Dummy variable that takes value one if the respondent farms in Alberta or British 
Columbia, and zero otherwise. 
ProvMB  Dummy variable that takes value one if a respondent farms in Manitoba, and zero 
otherwise. 
Soilbr  Dummy variable that takes value one if a respondent farms in brown soil-type 
zone, and zero otherwise. 
Soildb  Dummy variable that takes value one if a respondent farms in dark brown soil-type 
zone, and zero otherwise. 
Visual  A scale variable that takes value from one if a respondent strongly disagrees with 
the statement that increased tree cover in the region will detract from the visual 
appeal of the landscape, to five if a respondent strongly agrees.  A value of zero 
corresponds to no opinion/do not know answer. 
Trees  Number of acres of farmland covered with trees. 
Leave  Dummy variable that takes value of one if a respondent would leave agriculture if a 
warmer climate change scenario became a reality, and zero otherwise. 
Previous  Dummy variable that takes value of one if a respondent previously participated in a 
tree-planting program, and zero otherwise. 
Educ  Number of years of post-secondary education. 
Age  Median of an age category checked by a respondent (from 33 to 68 years with 5 
year intervals) 
Kids  Dummy variable that takes value of one if a respondent expects their children to 
continue farming. 
Networth  Normalized median of a networth category checked by a respondent (from $50,000 
to $1,000,000 with $100,000 intervals) 
 
Table 2.  Opportunity Cost Values For A Given Land-Use. 
Land-use  Per Acre Opportunity Cost (dollars) 
Pasture  42.00 
Hay  47.25 
Grain  71.85 
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Table 3.  Prediction Summary. 
    Actual Responses 
    0  1 
0  46  9 
Predicted Responses 
1  7  24 
Number of Actual Responses  86  53  33 
Number of Right Predictions  70     
Percentage of Right Predictions  81.4     
 











Constant  -1.1548  1.2962  -0.891  - 
BOC1
c  0.0338  0.0103  3.288  0.009 
Age
c  0.0287  0.0201  1.430  0.003 
Trees
c  0.0028  0.0012  2.251  0.001 
Soilbr  0.7056  0.6156  1.146  0.271 
Visual
c  -0.3573  0.2032  -1.758  -0.142 
Leave  0.3792  0.3085  1.229  0.086 
Educ
c  -0.1074  0.1014  -1.059  -0.042 
Networth
c  -0.3066  0.1921  -1.596  -0.122 
ProvAB  -0.4247  0.4810  -0.883  -0.149 
ProvMB  0.0418  0.6208  0.067  0.015 
Soildb  -0.1266  0.4559  -0.278  -0.045 
Kids  0.2332  0.4179  0.558  0.083 
Previous  -0.1735  0.3961  -0.438  -0.063 
Note: Superscript c indicates a continuous variable.  
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Table 5.  Distribution of Expected Willingness to Accept Tree-Planting Program ($/acre). 
Mean  Standard Deviation  Variance  Minimum  Maximum 
$ 40.52   29.99   899.14  - $ 27.78  $ 106.50 
 